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Abstract—In peer-to-peer content delivery systems, such as
BitTorrent, there may exist nodes that are non-cooperative
and do not contribute their upload bandwidth to the system
while still downloading content from others. The current widely
used countermeasures against this freeriding behavior have been
shown to be ineffective. In this paper, we address the problem by
leveraging the trust latent in the social networks and explicitly
incorporating the social links as part of the BitTorrent content
distribution infrastructure.
Our extensive system evaluation produces several insights.
First, the social network topology alone without the trackers
is an efficient and scalable content distribution medium. Second,
thanks to the cooperative social links, BitTorrent’s robustness to
freeriding significantly improves. Finally, we find that a hybrid
solution in which peers download from both their friends and
other peers obtained from the trackers has the highest robustness
to freeriding, shortest download completion times and the most
balanced upload bandwidth utilization.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most peer-to-peer content delivery systems are designed
to be open, any peer can join and any peer can potentially
communicate with any other peer in the system. The cor-
rect functioning of any P2P system relies on cooperation
between the peers. In large-scale open systems peers have
little prior knowledge about one another and cannot assume
that the others will always cooperate. BitTorrent peers can,
for example, choose to download files but not upload any
to conserve bandwidth. To prevent the freeriding behavior,
additional mechanisms have to be built into the system. The
design of such mechanisms is a non-trivial problem and has
received considerable attention ([21], [14], [10], [16]). We
propose an alternative solution to the problem based on the
following observation.
In most of the widely-deployed P2P content delivery sys-
tems a single peer usually corresponds to a single user. Given
the popularity of some of the P2P applications, it is very
likely that for most users a significant fraction of their social
network friends also use the same application. Most P2P
content delivery systems do not take advantage of these social
links.
In a social P2P system, communication occurs almost
exclusively between nodes whose owners have a trustworthy
social relationship. These systems are also known as darknets
[3], [19] or friend-to-friend (F2F) systems [13]. The basic as-
sumption behind such systems is that just as people interacting
in the real world are much less likely to cheat against friends
than strangers, peers in an F2F system are likely to behave
cooperatively towards other peers knowing that they belong
to friends. There is thus little need for additional cooperation-
enforcing mechanisms. This simplifies the system design.
In this paper we evaluate a socially-aware BitTorrent, in
which peers connect both to the peers obtained from the
trackers and to the peers belonging to the user’s friends. The
three core problems that we address are: (1) whether the
social network topology alone can function as a scalable and
efficient content distribution medium, (2) whether we can take
advantage of the social links for solving the freeriding problem
without sacrificing performance and (3) what is the number of
downloaders in the social network at which the benefit of using
the social links becomes significant.
In the first system variant we consider communication
occurs strictly only along the social links. The social network
topology alone turns out to be an efficient content distribution
medium (§IV-B) with the same system scaling properties as
the tracker-based BitTorrent (§IV-F). Only a small poorly con-
nected minority of the peers finish late, which is unavoidable
due the social networks’ power-law node degree distributions
[12].
We also examine the BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat (TFT) mecha-
nism [5] in the presence of freeriders. As in the other studies
([21], [14], [10], [16]), our measurements confirm that TFT
is not an effective solution to the freeriding problem. On the
other hand, the social BitTorrent turns out to be remarkably
robust to freeriding (§IV-B). There is only a slight increase
in completion times even as 33% of the peers are freeriders,
while in the classical tracker-based BitTorrent, the impact of
the freeriders on performance is much more significant.
One caveat of relying only on the social links for content
distribution is that not all the friends in the social network
might be interested in downloading the same content. If only
the social links are used for the downloads and the content
is rare, not all the peers might find download partners among
their friends and may not be able to complete the download.
For rare content, peers must thus still rely on the trackers to
discover the other peers interested in the same content. We
evaluate a hybrid design in which peers use both their friends
and the peers from the trackers for downloads. We show that
in such a system, even if the content is rare the social links
still improve the robustness to freeriding (§IV-D). The social
BitTorrent’s downloads are faster than regular BitTorrent’s up
until the fraction of downloaders in the social network falls
2below 2%. The 2% threshold clearly delineates the setups in
which the social networks can be leveraged to combat the
freeriding in BitTorrent. Our measurements additionally show
that apart from solving the sparse swarm problem, the hybrid
solution has the most balanced upload bandwidth utilization
(§IV-E) among all the evaluated system variants.
II. RELATED WORK
There are several P2P systems that use the concept of social
networks in one way or another. Li et al. [13] propose an
F2F system for scalable and durable storage. The Freenet
project [4] turns a social network into a privacy-preserving file-
sharing application with focus on efficient search [20]. Tribler
[18], another file-sharing application, allows the creation of
social groups. Peers can recruit their friends from the group
as download helpers to improve the performance. The helpers
contribute their bandwidth twice, downloading from the source
and then uploading to the friend that requested help. In
contrast, in our system there is no recruitment but we do take
advantage of the fact that two friends are downloading the
same content. None of the above work looks at the social
network topology as the sole means of content distribution
and does not clearly measure the performance benefits gained
from using the social links.
The popular BitTorrent client, Vuze, has recently added the
friends feature1. Users can allocate more upload bandwidth
to their friends and easily share torrent links with them. The
eMule client [11] has friend lists as well. Users can allocate
upload slots to friends so they do not need to wait in the queue.
However, up to our knowledge the performance impact of the
friend slots has not been investigated for large-scale BitTorrent
swarms, we do that in this paper.
The original solution to the problem of freeriding in
BitTorrent is the tit-for-tat algorithm which has been shown
to have limited effectiveness ([21], [14], [10], [16]). Several
other solutions have been proposed. Locher et al. [15] use
coding to increase block diversity in the network and change
the seeder strategy to only upload a globally fixed set of blocks
per leecher. This forces the freeriders to upload blocks to
other peers in order to obtain new blocks in return. In the
Piatek’s et al. approach [17], peers share download accounting
information (bytes sent, received etc.) of their neighbors with
the other neighbors. This one-hop reputation system enables
indirect reciprocity as opposed to TFT’s pairwise reciprocity
which results in increased performance. We propose to solve
the problem of freeriding by taking advantage of the social
links, for which cheating is unlikely. Each peer’s identity is
tied to a real person’s identity and we, in a way, use the
external ”human reputation system” for ensuring cooperative
peer behavior (§III-C).
Social networks can be used to improve the security and
privacy of peer-to-peer systems by constraining the communi-
cation only to the social links and cryptographically protecting
the exchanged data [19]. Friends can authenticate one another,
for example with PGP or other methods [2]. One such system
1http://azureus.sourceforge.net/
is OneSwarm [9], a friend-to-friend content delivery system
based on the Azureus BitTorrent client that leverages the social
network of Google Talk users to build an F2F system with the
goal of inhibiting the monitoring of user behavior by external
parties. The nodes communicate strictly only along the social
links. Content search is done by flooding the social network
with requests. The returning search responses build paths in
the network along which the content is then forwarded hop-
by-hop. This results in a much higher bandwidth consumption,
proportional to the number of hops. In contrast, in our system
all content is shared in a single hop as in the original BitTorrent
and we take advantage of the social network to solve the
freeriding problem and do not address the privacy or security.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Making BitTorrent social requires only a few changes. In
particular, the content distribution protocol does not have to be
modified in any way, we only change the way in which peers
discover one another. We also leave the standard mechanisms
unchanged, such as the periodic chokes/unchokes, the end-
game protocol and optimistic unchoking.
A. Friend connections
Since the social network topology is the integral part of the
system we need to provide the users with a way to manage
their social links (friend lists). To create a new social link the
two users exchange cryptographic information that is later used
for mutual authentication. Existing infrastructures such as PGP
or F2F-specific protocols [2] can be used to facilitate that. For
additional security the friend-to-friend communication can be
encrypted.
When a peer starts up, it needs to be able to find the peers
belonging to the other friends and connect to them. There exist
several ways of achieving this, most of the instant messaging
clients have solved this problem (e.g. the open decentralized
Jabber/XMPP2 infrastructure). The social BitTorrent could
also be integrated with the existing social network platforms
using their APIs, e.g. Facebook3. In our evaluation we simply
use a single instance of a friend server through which the peers
discover one another.
The connections to friends are added to the local peer list
and the standard BitTorrent protocol is executed as if these
peers were discovered through a tracker.
B. Friend upload priority
In the social BitTorrent the friend connections are treated
specially. Every time the upload slots are allocated, which hap-
pens periodically every 10s in our implementation, the friend
connections take absolute priority over the other connections
irrespective of their upload and download histories. For other,
non-friend connections we are still using the tit-for-tat (TFT),
i.e. upload slots are allocated to the peer that is uploading the
most.
2http://xmpp.org/about/jabber.shtml
3http://developers.facebook.com/
3C. Freeriding disincentive
The users are made aware of the friend connections and
all the activity occurring on them. The status of the friend
connections and the friend identities are displayed on the
user interface. If some friend refuses to upload anything or
artificially caps the upload bandwidth, it is clearly visible and
the identity of the cheater is known. We assume throughout
the paper that this provides a strong disincentive for freeriding
on friends, but does not prevent the users from freeriding on
non-friend peers.
IV. EVALUATION
We have implemented the social BitTorrent in the ProtoPeer
framework4 based on the unofficial BitTorrent specification5
complete with the trackers, the tit-for-tat mechanism, opti-
mistic unchoking, partially downloaded piece prioritization
and the end-game strategy.
We use the flow-based network model6 in ProtoPeer which
assumes a fixed upload bandwidth cap for each peer and
divides the bandwidth equally among the outgoing flows.
For simplicity, we assume the download bandwidth to be
unbounded, since the upload bandwidth is typically the bottle-
neck in file-sharing systems. To introduce diversity, we assume
that 10% of the peers have a high 2Mbit/s upload bandwidth,
30% are with 1Mbit/s and the rest with 512kbit/s, which is
loosely based on the residential broadband measurements in
[6]. In all the experiments we assume that initially a single
source has the complete file. The source has a 2Mbit/s upload
bandwidth.
The social network topologies for our evaluation were
generated based on node degree and clustering coefficient
distributions of an actual large-scale social graph of a popular
instant messaging client [12]. The node degree is bounded by
64 and the graph is connected.
Throughout our evaluation we assume that the peers arrive
in the system within the first 10 seconds and never depart.
We have determined in simulations that peer arrivals and
departures affect the social BitTorrent in the same way as the
regular one and we omit these results.
Unless otherwise stated, the downloaded content is a 25MB
file divided into 50 512kB pieces, each consisting of 32 16kB
blocks. All peers use the rarest first piece selection strategy.
The network consists of 256 nodes including the initial source.
We vary the network size and the content size in separate
scalability tests (§IV-F).
The freeriders in the system are defined as peers who ignore
all requests for content, but still request the content from the
other peers.
A. The lineup
We consider the following systems: BT - the classical
BitTorrent system using a centralized tracker to discover 25
random peers to connect to, SBT - the strictly social variant
4http://protopeer.epfl.ch
5http://wiki.theory.org/BitTorrentSpecification
6http://protopeer.epfl.ch/wiki/FlowBasedNetworkModel
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Fig. 1. Completion times. A 25MB file is distributed from a single initial
seeder using the BitTorrent system (BT) and social BitTorrent (SBT). We
measure the download completion times at non-freerider peers. The first 70%
of the peers in SBT complete their downloads 1 minute later than in BT. The
next 30% of the peers in SBT are mainly the nodes that are poorly connected
and require more time for the download. When every third peer is a freerider
in BT, the downloads slow down by 200s. Enabling tit-for-tat (TFT) improves
the performance, but BT is still slower than SBT.
of BitTorrent running on top of the generated social network,
the data flows only along the social links, no trackers are used
and HBT - the hybrid BitTorrent system, which uses both the
social links and the trackers to discover additional uploaders
as in the original BitTorrent.
B. Completion time
The most important performance metric of a file-sharing
system is the time it takes to complete the file download on
all the peers (Fig. 1).
Content distribution in the social network is not significantly
slower than in the open tracker-based system. However, SBT
suffers from the long-tail problem: the last 20%− 30% of the
peers complete their downloads much later than the majority.
Social graphs have a power-law degree distribution [12] with
many peers having only a few links. It is those peers that cause
the problem, they do not have enough peers to download from
and the whole download process is delayed.
The set of results on Fig. 1 also illustrates the superior ro-
bustness to freeriding of the social BitTorrent. When freeriders
are present, the open system (BT) is slower than the social
system (SBT) for the majority of the peers event when tit-for-
tat is enabled.
C. Sparse swarms
Up to now we have assumed that all the peers in the social
graph are interested in downloading the same file. This is not
likely in reality. Peers that are not interested in the file do
not download or upload any data. Let swarm density be the
fraction of peers in the social network that are interested in
the file. If the density is low then some interested peers may
not be able to reach any seeder via a chain of interested peers
and will not complete their downloads. We have confirmed
that this effect is in fact severe (Fig. 2).
To solve the sparse swarm problem the peers need some
method of finding other peers interested in downloading the
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Fig. 2. Sparse swarms. In the social BitTorrent system only some of the
social network’s nodes may want to download the file. This creates a problem:
not all the nodes can access a seeder via a chain of uploaders.
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Fig. 3. Varying the swarm density. In HBT, peers use both the peers
discovered via the tracker and their direct friends as the uploaders. The
BitTorrent systems without TFT and without freeriders are included as the
baselines. In all systems the social network size is 10000 and the file is 25MB.
The performance improvement gained by using the social links (HBT) is the
bigger the denser the swarm is. However, when the density falls below 2%
(i.e. less than 200 downloaders among the 10000 peers), the performance
advantage offered by the social links disappears.
same content. This can either be done in a decentralized way
by e.g. flooding the social network with search requests (as
in OneSwarm [9]) or by using the trackers as in the original
BitTorrent.
D. Adding the trackers - the hybrid system
To complete their downloads in a sparse swarm, peers can
discover additional uploaders through a tracker. At the same
time, the peers can still use their friends as reliable uploaders
when possible. We look at how the performance of such a
hybrid system (HBT) changes with the swarm density (Fig.
3).
In high density swarms peers have no trouble finding friends
interested in the same file. As the swarm density decreases,
peers can no longer rely on downloads from friends and have
to download from strangers, which can potentially be freerid-
ers. When the swarm density falls down to approximately 2%
the performance advantage of the social BitTorrent disappears,
the majority of downloads are from strangers. This clearly
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Fig. 4. CDF of the bandwidth utilization. A 25MB file is distributed
from a single initial seeder in the regular (BT), the social (SBT) and the
hybrid (HBT) BitTorrent system. Every third node is a freerider, tit-for-tat is
enabled. We measure the cumulative distribution function of the total upload
bandwidth used per node during the file distribution. The area to the left of
the curve remains constant across the systems, the same amount of data is
uploaded in total. The closer the curve is to a vertical line the more balanced
the bandwidth utilization is. Note: 10% of the peers have a 2Mbit/s upload
bandwidth, 30% 1Mbit/s and the rest 512kbit/s, which is visible on the plots
as ”steps”.
shows in which setups the social networks can be used to
improve BitTorrent’s robustness to freeriding.
E. Bandwidth utilization
Next we look at how balanced the bandwidth utilization
is in the system (Fig. 4). In the case of BT, the 33% of
the freeriders are clearly visible, they do not contribute any
bandwidth. In the case of SBT, a few socially well connected
nodes contribute a disproportionate amount of bandwidth to
serving the poorly connected nodes. The hybrid system (HBT)
is the most balanced, poorly connected nodes obtain additional
download sources from the trackers, while the majority of the
freeriding is prevented by leveraging the social links.
F. Scalability
In all our previous experiments the file size and the network
size were fixed. We now examine how the performance
changes as these parameters change (Fig. 5).
The results show that the download times scale linearly with
the file size and logarithmically with the number of peers in
the network. This is in line with the scaling formulas derived in
[8] for the optimal BitTorrent content distribution. The social
network alone (SBT) turns out to be just as scalable as the
classical solution based on the centralized tracker (BT), albeit
the completion times are slower due to the power-law degree
distributions of the social graphs (§IV-B).
V. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
Social network as a content distribution medium. We
have shown that the topology of the social network alone
without relying on the trackers can function as an efficient
and scalable content distribution medium. For the majority of
the nodes in the strictly social BitTorrent using only direct
friends as uploaders the completion times are as short as
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Fig. 5. System scaling. Every peer in the social network is interested in the
file. We vary the network and file size and measure the 90th percentile of
download times. All peers are active downloaders. The scaling is linear in the
file size and logarithmic in the network size. The system scaling properties of
the strictly social BitTorrent are not significantly different than those of the
regular tracker-based system.
in a BitTorrent system using trackers to interconnect the
peers. However, the peers with fewer friends experience longer
completion times and to improve their performance need to
find additional uploaders. The best uploaders are simply new
friends. This creates a strong incentive for the friends to
connect to other friends and could potentially drive the growth
of BitTorrent’s social network.
Robustness to freeriding. The BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat mech-
anism is known to be an ineffective solution to the freeriding
problem ([21], [14], [10], [16]). We have confirmed this
in our measurements (§IV-B). When freeriders are present,
enabling tit-for-tat increases the performance, but only slightly.
This ineffectiveness, as others have observed [1], is mainly
attributable to the altruism of the seeders, which unchoke
downloaders without regard to their past upload performance.
We have confirmed experimentally that indeed the reli-
able social links are crucial to increasing the robustness to
freeriding. Even when 33% of the additional uploaders are
freeriders the performance of the social BitTorrent drops
only insignificantly. The social network forms a backbone
for reliable cooperative content distribution and the freeriders’
impact is lowered.
Best of two worlds: the hybrid system. The BitTorrent’s
tit-for-tat mechanism does not prevent freeriding, but merely
provides a disincentive for it. The freeriders do not contribute
any of their upload bandwidth and, as we have measured
in §IV-E, the downloaders must download from other peers,
which creates a bandwidth utilization imbalance in the system.
In the BitTorrent variant that uses only the social links for
downloads (SBT), a small fraction of the peers are poorly
connected and use the highly connected peers as download
hubs. This is a fundamental problem caused by the power-law
node degree distributions of the social graphs [12]. Again,
there is a bandwidth utilization imbalance in the system.
As we have shown, the above two approaches can be
combined into one (HBT), in which peers connect to both
their friends as well as strangers discovered via the centralized
trackers. This results in a system with a balanced bandwidth
utilization, high robustness to freeriding and short download
completion times.
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